The Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters specifies that (single-seat) constituencies should be drawn so that the size difference of a constituency's size from the average should not exceed a fixed limit while its borders must not cross the borders of administrative regions, such as states or counties.
Introduction
Fair representation is the cornerstone of representative democracies. The idea that each congressmen should represent the same number of citizens is as old as the United States. We study the so-called apportionment problem (for recent texts see Pukelsheim, 2014 or Chapter 1 of Kubiak, 2009) : sharing a 5 given number of seats among a given set of regions with known populations in a fair way and look for mechanisms that provide a unique solution to each problem. Such a unique solution leaves no room for political bargaining and manipulation in designing or updating the legal framework for elections.
The stakes at the elections are very high and therefore the codification of 10 any electoral law should be done with great care. Seemingly an easy problem, establishing electoral districts 1 with equal numbers of voters becomes nontrivial, when they must fit into the existing administrative structure of a country.
There are alternative ways to approach the problem, generating a constant debate even in countries with well-established democracies such as the United
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States. (For a comprehensive historical overview see Balinski and Young, 1982) .
A new entrant to this debate, the European Commission for Democracy through Similar conditions are common, though not universal. In Georgia, where the electoral law of 1999 did not set rules about the sizes of constituencies, the number of voters per (single-seat) constituency ranged from some 3,600 voters in the Lent'ekhi district or 4,200 in the Kazbegi districts to over 138,000 in Ukraine); 15 percent (e.g., Armenia, Germany, and the Czech Republic) and 20 percent (e.g., Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea). In Canada, the independent commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts are allowed to 55 deviate by up to 25 percent from the provincial quotas, and even more under 'extraordinary circumstances'." (Handley, 2007) . In Singapore the tolerance is 30%; a recent proposal to reform the constituency map of the United Kingdom worked with a 5% permitted deviation from the average size (Balinski et al., 2010) . The draft version of the 2012 electoral law of Hungary adopted the Venice
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Commission's recommendation almost word by word, but the 10-15% maximum admissible departure between the population of any two constituency turned out to be infeasible given the actual size of the parliament and the populations of counties, if the constituencies cannot extend over county borders (Biró et al., 2012; Bodnár, 2012) . Even with the subsequent relaxation, allowing a 15% (at most 20%) departure from the average size of constituencies in the final version, the requirements were just met.
We take this maximum admissible departure property and compare it with the properties that had been used to evaluate and judge apportionment methods. As generally there may be more than one apportionments satisfying this 70 property, we look for apportionments where the maximum admissible departure is the lowest, then applying the same idea to the second largest difference, and so on. The naturally emerging leximin apportionment is unique (up to symmetries) and can be calculated using an efficient algorithm.
We focus on the simple setting where (1) districts elect single represen-75 tatives, (2) forming even constituencies within each of the regions is possible and (3) representation is proportional. The results generalise directly to multirepresentative districts. In designing the constituencies of a region not only the obvious integer problem (such as having two equal-sized constituencies in a region with odd population), but contiguity requirements and town and township 80 boundaries too, create additional constraints that make the actual apportionment a little less equal. How the actual borders of the constituencies are drawn is yet another question. The strategic, manipulative design of voting districts, known as gerrymandering (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2010; Chambers and Miller, 2013) (Penrose, 1946 , Shapley and Shubik, 1954 and Banzhaf, 1965 ; for a recent survey see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998 ) study weighted voting situations such as the European Council of Ministers (Kóczy, 2011 ), Penrose's square root law (Penrose, 1946) or the degressive proportionality (Laslier, 2012; Koriyama et al., 2013) of the base+prop method (Pukelsheim, 2007) promoted in the Cambridge
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Compromise (Grimmett, 2012; Grimmett et al., 2011; Rose et al., 2012) and give explicit recommendations on how to adjust for this. With the appropriate population adjustments, these problems, however, can be reduced to proportional allocation.
In the following we first formalise the apportionment problem and critically 100 discuss the (smallest) maximum admissible departure property. In Sections 4
and 5 we introduce the leximin solution for apportionment problems and then apply this to apportionment problems from various countries: we compare the leximin solution with the actual apportionment as outlined by the new electoral law of Hungary and make a similar comparison for the German Bundestag and 105 the United States House of Representatives. We conclude with a more technical discussion of the related apportionment methods in literature.
The apportionment problem, mechanisms and their properties
An apportionment problem (p, H) is a pair consisting a vector
of state populations, where P = n i=1 p i is the population of the country and H denotes the number of seats in the legislature or House. Our task is to de-110 termine the non-negative integers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n with n i=1 a i = H representing the number of constituencies in states 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let p ∈ N n + and a ∈ N n be the n-dimensional vectors that contain the population sizes and the allotted number of seats respectively (where N + = {1, 2, 3, . . . }). An apportionment method or rule is a function M that assigns an 115 allotment for each apportionment problem (p, H). The fraction pi P H is called the respective share of state i. Throughout the paper we will employ the following notation: let x, y ∈ R n , we say that x ≥ y if x i ≥ y i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In the following we introduce several properties of apportionments. There is a related monotonicity requirement and an associated paradox when populations are considered. The population paradox arises when the population 145 of two states increases at different rates. Then it is possible that the state with more rapid growth actually loses seats to the state with slower growth. Table 3 presents an example where the population paradox emerges. 
Note that this definition of population monotonicity is slightly stricter than the one used in the literature in general, see for instance (Lauwers and Van Puyenbroeck, 2008) or (Balinski and Young, 1982) . However as we will see even this strict property is violated by some rules.
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Balinski and Young (1975) provided a so-called Quota-method that is housemonotonic and fulfills the quota property as well, but proved that no method that is free from both Alabama and the population paradoxes satisfies quota (Balinski and Young, 1982) . In the next section we will provide examples exhibiting these paradoxes. The most common interpretation is that there should be a limit on the allowable departure of the average number of registered voters per constituency (see Handley (2007) ). We follow this practice as well, nevertheless our results hold in general, irrespective of the chosen reference data.
denote the average size of a constituency, let δ i be the difference in percentage, displayed by the constituencies of state i and let d i be its absolute value.
Formally
Definition 3. An apportionment rule M satisfies the q-fixed maximum ad-
≤ q for any apportionment problem (p, H) and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
As we pointed out in the introduction European electoral laws impose a fixed limit on max i∈{1,...,n} {d i } rather than minimizing it. The Venice Com-170 mission follows this practice as well. It can happen, however, that, given an apportionment problem, no allotment exists that satisfy a certain limit, while an allotment with smallest maximum admissible departure always exists. Thus we focus on the latter concept. For a given apportionment problem (p, H) let α (p,H) be the smallest maximum admissible departure that can be achieved with 175 an allotment i.e.
where A(n, H) denotes the set of n-dimensional non-negative vectors for which the sum of the coordinates is H.
Definition 4. An apportionment rule M satisfies the smallest maximum admis-
(p, H) and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The philosophy behind the quota and the smallest maximum admissible departure property is very similar, but not quite the same. The quota specifies how many seats a state should receive at least and at most. If a state gets less than its lower quota, then the allotment can be considered somewhat unfair from the 185 point of view of that particular state. The smallest maximum admissible departure property is concerned rather with the individual voter. If the population sizes of the constituencies differ too much so does the voters' influence. Not surprisingly, the quota property plays more central role in the U.S. where the states are large and highly independent. In Europe, where the countries consist 190 of small and in some sense uniform counties, the smallest maximum admissible departure property is more accepted.
The smallest maximum admissible departure property
In this section we review the basic features of the smallest maximum admissible departure property. In the following we will omit the lower index of α (p,H) respectively denote these quotas of state i and let β i denote the minimum difference achievable for state i. The maximum of these β i values, denoted by β, is a natural lower bound for α. Formally:
Empirical analysis shows that, in general, increasing H results in a lower α ceteris paribus. The problem with small House sizes is that they imply a larger Table 1 summarizes the problematic state population sizes. 0.091 Table 1 : Critical state populations regarding divisibility. The first column shows the lower and upper quotas, p * i are the population levels where the minimal difference produced by these is maximal, and β i is the corresponding worst case value of the minimal difference.
In other words, if there is a state with population 4 3 of the average constituency size then α is at least 1 3 . For this value a lower d cannot be adhered 220 to. One way to overcome this is to increase the house size H and thereby increase the number of constituencies allocated to each state, in particular, to the smallest state. Let i denote the smallest state and
As the House size increases, l i increases, and therefore γ decreases. Note that γ is an upper bound for β but there is no obvious connection between γ 225 and α. For instance, if we are able to distribute the seats according to the exact quota, then α is zero, but γ can be high. However let p 1 , p 2 = 200 and p 3 = 600
and let the House size equal to 7. Then γ = 1 3 , but α ≥ 0.4. We will further analyze the relation of α, β and γ in Section 5 using real data.
Properties
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As we mentioned earlier, the quota and smallest maximum admissible departure properties have different objectives. An apportionment method that implements the latter will distribute less seats to a state than its lower quota if the maximum admissible departure can be lowered in this way. Large states serve as puffers where superfluous seats can be allocated or seats can be ac-235 quired if there are needed elsewhere as these do not change the average size of constituencies dramatically. In the above example the total population equals to 201 while the average constituency size is 10.05. If we insist on applying the quota then State E must receive at least 9 seats. As a result State A -the smallest one -gets only 2.
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The voters in State A have the least influence, nearly 30% less than on average.
On the other hand, if we apply the smallest maximum admissible departure property, State A gets an extra seat and the largest bias is reduced to 13.8%. 
Greedy leximin algorithm
Let us refer to a ∈ N n as a pre-allotment if the i a i = H condition is 
If l > H then for each t = 0, 1 . . . l − H − 1 do the following adjustment.
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That is, we first find a pre-allotment a[0] that is lexicographically minimal and then we simply increase (or decrease) the number of seats in a greedy way, we add (or remove) a seat to (or from) state i if the increased difference is the smallest for this state. In what follows we show that these greedy adjustments lead to leximin pre-allotments in each step, and therefore a leximin allotment 315 at the end of the process. 
), we could decrease the departure of b from the average size in both states i and j by moving one seat from j to i,
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contradicting to the optimality of b.
First we prove that ∆(a[t]) ≺ ∆(b). Let i be a state where
(there must be such a state since b allocates one more seat than a[t]). Then
, which is in contradiction with our assumption since b i− is an allotment with l + t seats. entries of b are also the same, so in each of the corresponding r − 1 states all these three pre-allotments assign the same number of seats (thus they are identical for these r − 1 states). Regarding state i, it must be the case that 
with the selection of i in the greedy algorithm.
Note that both Phase 1 and Phase 2 can be conducted in n 2 steps, if one step means a comparison of two differences.
Data Analysis
In this section we first evaluate the 2011 Electoral Law of Hungary that 365 triggered our interest in the recommendations of the Venice Commission at the first place. Then we look at the United States House of Representatives and the German Bundestag and discuss the allocation of seats according to the leximin method.
Hungary
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The 2011 Electoral Law of Hungary drastically decreased the number of seats in the parliament and fixed the number of constituencies at 106. The law also proposed a seat distribution among the counties. Although the apportionment method was not provided, the law prescribed some principles for subsequent redistribution of seats. These conditions closely followed the directives of the Venice Comission. The law requires that the difference between the population of any constituency and the average constituency size should be within 15%.
The only exception is if a constituency would extend over the county border or its connectivity could not be ensured. In these cases higher difference is allowed, but if it ever exceeds 20% then a new allotment should be provided. influence can be as high as 50%. Interestingly, it is not these counties where the apportionment by law differs from the results of the 7 common methods calculated by Bodnár (2012) , but Pest and Somogy.
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Upper bounds on the smallest maximum admissible departure
The following figure shows how the smallest maximum admissible departure from the average constituency size (α) changes as we increase the House size from 50 to 180. To calculate the smallest maximum admissible departure the leximin method was used. But even for these values it is true that α < γ. Our conjecture is that for real life data α rarely differs from β, therefore γ can be an effective upper bound for both. That means that if one would like to meet the Venice Commission's recommendation, then the House size should be set so high that the lower quota of the smallest county is at least 3 for the strict 15% limit.
Due to the demographic changes the local minimum of α shifted from 106 to 108 in four years. It can easily happen that in the near future 106 seats would mean the local maximum for α. A solution for this issue would be to choose the House size from an interval rather than fixing it. Although this seems to 410 lead to an unpredictable system, in reality it would imply only a minor change from one election to the next as there would be one or two counties that would receive extra seats or have to give up one.
Monotonicity Figure 2 shows how frequently the Alabama-paradox occurs as the House 415 size changes.
The anomaly occurs only in the two largest counties 4 . As we mentioned earlier, the explanation is simple: large counties behave as puffers. They can store seats for smaller counties that are crucial for the leximin ordering.
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Changing the size of the regions Finally, another way to lower the smallest maximum admissible departure is to increase the size of the administrative units that bundles the constituencies. Instead of counties we can use regions requiring only that no constituency extends over the region border. Table 6 summarizes the results for regions.
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For instance, Northern Hungary consists of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves and Nógrád counties. By the law 7, 3 and 2 seats are assigned to them respectively, altogether 12. Heves produces the highest difference from the average: 10.87%. However if we treat these three counties as one administrative unit then it receives 13 seats and the sizes of its constituencies will be 76605, only Table 6 : The optimal seat distribution where no constituency extends over the region border
The German Bundestag
Similarly to the Hungarian election system, Germans voters may cast two Here we analyze the seats that are elected directly with the first votes using data from the 2013 elections (?). The average constituency size is 207 180. fares in general when compared with our leximin approach.
The leximin vs. the equal proportions method
To further illustrate the properties of the leximin rule let us compare it with the equal proportion (EP) method (Huntington, 1921) , that is used to distribute the seats of the US House of Representatives. The method of Equal Proportions 
Smallest maximum admissible departures
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As it can be anticipated the smallest maximum admissible departure of the leximin solution never exceeds 33.3% however for the EP there is no such limit.
To make certain that the smallest maximum admissible departure is below 20%
we have to ensure that the smallest state, Wyoming a) receives at least two representatives and b) the constituency size obtained this way is within 20% 495 of the average. A simple calculation shows that the smallest House size that guarantees these two criteria is 871 -a little more than twice its current size.
As it is unlikely that the House of Representatives will be expanded in such 
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The smallest maximum admissible departure for both the leximin and the EP solution meets its minimum at House size 442. In that case the highest gap between voters influence is 'only' 55.19%.
Conclusion
More and more countries adopt fairness measures in their electoral law that is 505 based on, or similar to the recommendation of the Venice Commission (2002a).
Based on the smallest maximum admissible departure property we introduce the well-defined Leximin Rule.
Our apportionment method is not the first. The problem of apportionment goes centuries back, the problem has been around ever since the new member 510 states and population changes required a new seat allocation in the US House of Representatives. Balinski and Young (1982) give an illuminating theoretical and historical overview of the problem of apportionment and the political debates 
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Apportionment problems are most often used for allocating seats among administrative or political regions based on the population size of these regions:
states in the US House of Representatives, countries in the EU parliament and so on. Our paper focuses on these applications. Apportionment is also used for the allotment of seats to parties based on the outcome of an election, in 525 fact, sometimes both segmentations appear at the same time; the so-called biapportionment is used in some European countries and the problem has been studied by Demange (2012) and Serafini and Simeone (2012) .
The Lexicographic Rule is, to the best of our knowledge, an original apportionment method, although lexicographic solution concepts have already been
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proposed by Gambarelli (1999) and Gambarelli and Palestini (2007) . The closest model is by Serafini and Simeone (2012) , where the relative differences from the target quotas are lexicographically minimized in the bi-apportionment problem. However, their target quotas are not the same as ours (when restricted to a one-dimensional case), and their methods proposed are more complex, since 535 they are designed for the more general bi-apportionment problem.
There are also papers on minimizing the relative difference over pairs of constituencies. Burt and Harris (1963) proposed this concept in for the US House of Representatives, but then it got criticized by Gilbert and Schatz (1964) .
A recent overview on this concept is given by Edelman (2006) . Our problem 540 is different from this one, and it is easy to construct an example where the solutions minimizing the relative difference of any two constituencies and the maximum departure from the average size differ. So far, it seems, none of these models are compatible with the recommendation of the Venice Commission.
The smallest maximum admissible departure property is very natural and 545 provides greater equality among citizens concerning their voting power than other apportionment principles. Unfortunately, the property and therefore the Leximin Rule turn out to be incompatible with the quota, the population-and house-monotonicities over the class of apportionment problems, so that the Alabama and population paradoxes may arise when using it. It seems we have 550 just introduced a new method that fails all existing industry standards! Indeed these properties emerged over century-long debates over the election rules for the US House of Representatives and cannot be just ignored. On the other hand the proposal of the Venice Commission is a very natural and plausible one, it is comparable to the quota, while the violations of monotonicity are hardly sur-
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prising in an integer problem. The fact that more and more countries consider the smallest maximum admissible departure property as its de facto standard to evaluate, improve and design apportionment among regions may be seen as an indication that this is a natural and valid property whose incompatibility with some old thoughts from the New World is interesting to be aware of, but 560 is perhaps time to update them in a representative democracy. And finally, a third reading is just to note the emergence of two incompatible schools of apportionment that may coexist thanks to minor differences in our understanding of representative democracy. 
